

Export Market Penetration Dynamics

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May 27, 2021

Intro: motivation

Heterogeneity + micro dynamics key drivers of aggregate trade

- ▶ Long run: new goods and least-traded products respond most
- ▶ Short run: persistence in export participation, “new exporter dynamics” slow adjustment

Cross-section of exporters varies systematically across destinations

- ▶ “Harder” markets: less concentration, fewer small exporters
- ▶ Aggregate implication: greater LR responses to trade shocks in harder markets

This paper:

- ▶ How—and why—do exporter dynamics vary across markets?
- ▶ What are the consequences for aggregate trade dynamics?

Intro: contributions

[T]he literature has largely avoided the treatment of a firm's dynamic decisions across multiple destinations. The literature on (static) quantitative trade and firm heterogeneity has focused on the impact of geography on [exporting] costs. Merging these two approaches is a relatively unexplored, but promising, avenue of future research. —Alessandria et al. (2020)

Data: Brazilian exporters' life cycles vary systematically across destinations

- ▶ Harder markets: higher turnover, entrants larger and exit less often

Theory: Parsimonious model of customer accumulation across multiple destinations

- ▶ Synthesize market pen. costs (Arkolakis, 2010) + sunk costs (Das et al., 2007)
- ▶ One mechanism generates cross-sectional + dynamic facts, variation across markets
- ▶ Tractable in DSGE (Steinberg, 2019)

Quantitative: Larger, more prolonged responses to shocks in harder markets

- ▶ Consistent with evidence from Brazil's 1999 depreciation

Data

Data: overview

Source: Brazilian customs data during 1996–2008

Variables: destination, value, year, product, firm ID

Processing:


- ▶ Keep mfg. and 63 destinations with 20+ exporters/year
- ▶ Aggregate across products to firm-destination-year panel

Definitions:

- ▶ Entrant: firm i that exports to destination j in year t but not in $t - 1$
- ▶ Incumbent: firm i that exports to destination j in t and $t - 1$
- ▶ Exit: firm i that exports to destination j in t but not in $t + 1$

Analysis: how do distribution + dynamics of exporters vary across destinations?

Data: distribution + dynamics of exporters across markets





“Harder” markets have

- ▶ Greater concentration
- ▶ Exporters that serve many other markets
- ▶ Lower overall turnover
- ▶ Entrants that are smaller and exit more often

What makes a harder market?

- ▶ Smaller population
- ▶ Lower income per capita
- ▶ Higher trade costs

Data: exporter-level sales trajectories across markets



- ▶ Estimate sales trajectories for exporters with different spell durations (Fitzgerald et al., 2020)

$$\log ex_{i,j,t} = \alpha + \sum_{m,n} \beta_{m,n} \mathbb{1}\{\text{duration}_{i,j}=m\} \mathbb{1}\{\text{yrs. in mkt}_{i,j,t}=n\} + f_j + f_t + \epsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- ▶ Separate sample into two groups:
 - ▶ Hard markets: bottom 50% in num. exporters
 - ▶ Easy markets: top 50%
- ▶ Compared to easy markets, hard markets have
 - ▶ Smaller differences in entrants' sales
 - ▶ Less growth over spells

Model

Model: overview

Importing countries indexed by $j = 1, \dots, J$ with three traits:

- ▶ Population, L_j
- ▶ GDP per capita, Y_j
- ▶ Trade barrier, τ_j

Exporting country populated by unit measure of firms

- ▶ Cost of exporting depends on level of + change to customer base
- ▶ Endogenous entry + exit, expansion + contraction

Partial equilibrium

- ▶ Small open economy: exogenous importing-country characteristics
- ▶ Small export sector: exogenous exporting-country wage = 1

Model: firms

Heterogeneity:

- ▶ Productivity, $x \sim \text{lognormal}(0, \sigma_x^2)$, redraw w/ prob. ρ_x
- ▶ Demand, $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, z_2, \dots, z_J)$, $\log z'_j = \rho_z z_j + \sigma_z \epsilon_j$
- ▶ Customer base, $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, m_2, \dots, m_J) \in [0, 1]^J$

Exogenous creation + destruction

- ▶ Die with probability $1 - \delta(x) = \max(0, \min(e^{\delta_0 x} + \delta_1))$
- ▶ Dying firms replaced by new ones with $\mathbf{m} = 0$

Standard CRS production + monopolistic competition

Model: demand, pricing, and profits

Market j 's demand for a firm's product depends on

- ▶ Price, p
- ▶ Demand, z
- ▶ Customer base, $m \in [0, 1]$

Individual consumer's demand: $c_j(z, p) = L_j Y_j z^{\theta-1} p^{-\theta}$

Total demand: $y_j(z, m, p) = m c_j(z, p)$

CRS implies profit-max problem separable across markets:

$$\pi_j(x, z, m) = \max_p \left\{ p y_j(z, m, p) - \frac{\tau_j y_j(z, m, p)}{x} \right\} = \left(\frac{1}{1 - \theta} \right) m L_j Y_j \left(\frac{xz}{\tau_j} \right)^{\theta-1}$$

Model: market penetration dynamics

Firm's customer base evolves according to $m' = n + o$, where

- ▶ $n \in [0, 1 - m]$: new customers attracted
- ▶ $o \in [0, m]$ old customers retained

Attraction + retention depend on advertising as in Arkolakis (2010):

$$\partial n / \partial a_n = \psi_n L_j^{-\alpha_n} (1 - m)^{-\beta_n} \left(\frac{1 - m - n}{1 - m} \right)^{\gamma_n}$$

$$\partial o / \partial a_o = \psi_o L_j^{-\alpha_o} m^{-\beta_o} \left(\frac{m - o}{m} \right)^{\gamma_o}$$

- ▶ a_n, a_o : advertising to attract new customers, retain old ones
- ▶ ψ_n, ψ_o : efficiency level
- ▶ α_n, α_o : macro return to market size
- ▶ β_n, β_o : micro return to market size
- ▶ γ_n, γ_o : convexity/diminishing returns

Model: market penetration costs

Attraction/retention costs depend on current customer base and mass of new customers attracted/old customers retained:

$$a_{n,j}(m, n) = \frac{L_j^{\alpha_n} (1 - m)^{\beta_n}}{\psi_n (1 - \gamma_n)} \left[1 - \left(\frac{1 - m - n}{1 - m} \right)^{1 - \gamma_n} \right]$$
$$a_{o,j}(m, o) = \frac{L_j^{\alpha_o} m^{\beta_o}}{\psi_o (1 - \gamma_o)} \left[1 - \left(\frac{m - o}{m} \right)^{1 - \gamma_o} \right]$$

Given current customer base m , cost of getting to m' given by

$$f_j(m, m') = \min_{n,o} \{ a_{n,j}(m, n) + a_{o,j}(m, o) \}$$

s.t. $0 \leq n \leq 1 - m, \quad 0 \leq o \leq m, \quad m' = n + o$

Model: equilibrium market penetration

Dynamic program also separable across markets:

$$V_j(x, z, m) = \max_{m'} \left\{ \pi(x, z, m') - f_j(m, m') + \delta(x) Q \mathbb{E} [V_j(x', z', m') | x, z] \right\}$$

Solution: $\underbrace{f_{j,m'}(m, m')}_{\text{marginal cost}} \geq \underbrace{\tilde{\pi}_j(xz)^{\theta-1}}_{\text{marginal profit}} - \underbrace{\beta \delta(x) Q \mathbb{E} [f_{j,m}(m', m'') | x, z]}_{\mathbb{E}[\downarrow] \text{ in future exporting cost}}$

- ▶ If $m = 0$, enter if $z \geq \underline{z}_j(x)$:

$$f_{j,m'}(0, 0) = \tilde{\pi}_j(x \underline{z}_j(x))^{\theta-1} - \delta(x) Q \mathbb{E} [f_{j,m}(0, m'') | x, z]$$

- ▶ If $m > 0$, exit if $m \leq \underline{m}_j(x, z)$:

$$f_{j,m'}(\underline{m}_j(x, z), 0) = \tilde{\pi}_j(xz)^{\theta-1} - \delta(x) Q \mathbb{E} [f_{j,m}(0, m'') | x, z]$$

Model: key properties + relationship to other theories

Export participation driven by exporting cost, f

- ▶ Melitz (2003): fixed cost $f > 0$
- ▶ Arkolakis (2010): $f(m)$ to reach $m \in [0, 1]$ customers, $f'' > 0$
- ▶ Sunk cost: $f(s)$ depends on export status $s \in \{0, 1\}$
- ▶ **This paper:** $f(m, m')$ to reach m' customers given current m

Key properties:

- ▶ $f_2(m, 0) > 0 \Rightarrow$ entry + exit
- ▶ $f_{22}(m, m') > 0 \Rightarrow$ concentration
- ▶ $f_{21}(m, m') < 0 \Rightarrow$ new exporter dynamics
 - ▶ $f_2(0, m') > f_2(m, m') \Rightarrow$ entrants start small then grow
 - ▶ $f_2(0, 0) > f_2(m, 0) \Rightarrow$ exit rate \downarrow in m
- ▶ $f_2(m, m') / (L_j Y_j) \downarrow$ in $L_j, Y_j \Rightarrow$ variation in exporter dynamics across markets

Calibration

Calibration: strategy

Assignments: direct data analogues + standard values

- ▶ Destination characteristics (Y_j, L_j, τ_j) from CEPII Gravity database
- ▶ Demand elasticity $(\theta) = 5$
- ▶ Interest rate $(1/Q - 1) = 10\%$

Indirect inference: choose all other parameters so that simulated data reproduce

- ▶ Correlations between export participation and market characteristics
- ▶ Scatter plots of distribution + dynamics against export participation

Validation: compare simulated life-cycle sales trajectories against data

Exploration: how do exporting costs vary across firms + markets in equilibrium?


Calibration: parameter values

Parameter	Meaning	Value
<i>(a) Distribution of firm types</i>		
σ_x	Prod. variance	1.02
ρ_x	Prod. persistence	0.98
σ_z	Demand variance	0.44
ρ_z	Demand persistence	0.60
δ_0	Corr(survival,prod.)	34.7
δ_1	Min. death prob.	0.03
<i>(c) New customer attraction costs</i>		
α_n	Macro return to mkt. size	0.51
β_n	Micro return to mkt. size	0.94
γ_n	Convexity	6.50
ψ_n	Level	0.10
<i>(d) Old customer retention costs</i>		
α_o	Macro return to mkt. size	0.96
β_o	Micro return to mkt. size	0.79
γ_o	Convexity	1.75
ψ_o	Level	0.06


- ▶ Productivity more dispersed + more persistent than demand
- ▶ $\psi_n \approx \psi_o$: mirrors exog. new exporter dynamics models with similar startup and continuation costs
- ▶ $\alpha_n < \alpha_o$: larger macro returns to market size in attracting new customers
- ▶ $\beta_n > \beta_o$: larger micro returns to market size in retaining old customers
- ▶ $\gamma_n > \gamma_o$: attracting new customers gets harder more rapidly than retaining old ones

Calibration: fit with data

Targeted moments



Non-targeted moments



Aggregate implications

Aggregate implications: overview

For each destination, analyze transition dynamics following:

- ▶ Permanent 10% reduction in trade cost τ_j
- ▶ Temporary 10% RER depreciation ($\log RER'_j = 0.9 \log RER_j + \epsilon_j$)


Compute average responses for easy destinations (top 50% in num. exporters) and hard destinations (bottom 50%)

- ▶ Overall response: trade elasticity
- ▶ Extensive margin: number of exporters
- ▶ Firm-level intensive margin: number of customers


Compare to evidence in customs data from Brazil's 1999 RER depreciation

Agg. implications: permanent trade reform


(a) Num. exporters (% chg)



(b) Avg. mkt. pen. (% chg)




(c) Trade elasticity




Agg. implications: temp. RER shock


(a) Exports (% chg)



(b) Num. exporters (% chg)




(c) Avg. mkt. pen (% chg)




Years since policy change

Agg. implications: evidence from Brazil's 1999 depreciation



- ▶ Brazil's RER depreciated by 200% between 1998–2003
- ▶ Exports to hard markets grew more, even after accounting for changes in multilateral import demand

$$\log Y_{j,t} = \alpha + \sum_{s=1998}^{2006} \mathbb{1}_{\{t=s\}} \left[\beta_{s,easy} \mathbb{1}_{\{j \in \text{easy}\}} + \beta_{s,hard} \mathbb{1}_{\{j \in \text{hard}\}} \right] + \delta_1 \log NER_{j,t} + \delta_2 \log CPI_{j,t} + \delta_3 \log RGDP_{j,t} + \delta_4 \log IM_{j,t} + f_j + \epsilon_{j,t}$$



- ▶ Greater growth in harder markets in other contexts:
 - ▶ Mix (2021): following creation of FTA
 - ▶ Boehm et al. (2020): following change in MFN tariffs

Conclusion

Summary

Brazilian microdata show that microeconomic dynamics of exporting firms differ systematically across markets


- ▶ Lower exit rate, more pronounced new exporter dynamics in easier markets
- ▶ Less sales growth with time in a market in easier markets

Simple theory of exporter selection and expansion accounts for these facts

- ▶ Synthesizes static models of endogenous market penetration costs with dynamic sunk-cost models
- ▶ Predicts larger, more prolonged responses to trade shocks in “harder” destinations, consistent with empirical evidence


Extras

Model: solution to export-cost minimization problem




Model: mechanism visualization

(a) Marginal cost $f_{j,m'}(m, m')$




(b) Policy function $m'_j(z, m)$




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


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


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


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


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


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


Model: mechanism visualization

(a) Marginal cost $f_{j,m'}(m, m')$



(b) Policy function $m'_j(z, m)$



Calibration: endogenous variation in export costs

Sunk cost models: startup cost $\sim 10\times$ continuation cost required to match high persistence of export status

- ▶ Das et al. (2007), Alessandria-Choi (2007, 2014)

New exporter dynamics models: similar startup + continuation costs, but former higher when measured relative to profits

- ▶ Ruhl-Willis (2017), Alessandria + al. (2020)


Exog. variation across firms, dests. required to match cross section, even in models with firm-level intensive margin growth

- ▶ Piveteau (2016), Fitzgerald + (2020)

How do export costs vary endogenously across firms + markets in this model?

$$\begin{bmatrix} \log f_{i,j,t} \\ \frac{f_{i,j,t}}{\pi_{i,j,t}} \end{bmatrix} = \alpha + \sum_{m=1}^6 \sum_{n=1}^m \beta_{m,n} \mathbb{1}_{\{\text{duration}_{i,j}=m\}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\text{yrs in mkt}_{i,j,t}=n\}} + f_j + f_t + \epsilon_{i,j,t}$$

Calibration: endogenous variation in export costs



Levels:

- ▶ Easy dests: flat w/ time in a market
- ▶ Hard dests: \uparrow w/ time in a market
- ▶ Higher for more successful exporters

Relative to profits:

- ▶ \downarrow w/ time in a market
- ▶ More pronounced \downarrow in easy dests.